Military training compels people to do things that they would not ordinarily do in civilian life. A typical recruit is removed from everyday life, first to boot camp and then to the battlegrounds. The reality of home, neighbours and family recedes into the background, often alongside the normal moral restraints that advocate respect for human dignity. An effective soldier is taught to distance himself from his enemies and not to view them as people with lives similar to his own. This distancing is often accomplished by typifying the enemy as an alien, with strange beliefs, culture and looks. Soldiers are trained to deny the enemy his humanity; this is often accomplished by viewing the enemy as an animal. In the Gulf War, for instance, the military described the killing of thousands of retreating enemy soldiers as a 'turkey shoot' (Glover 1999) .
Are biomedical scientists inadvertently trained in an analogous manner when it comes to the treatment of their research animals? There are many parallels between military training and the way scientists are conditioned to view their subjects as 'enemies'. Certainly, some (though not all) biologists were trained at biomedical institutions in which there was little concern for the animals studied beyond adhering to government guidelines. In the laboratory, we do things to animals that we would not even dream of doing to our pets, or anybody else's for that matter. We often house laboratory animals alone in sterile cages. We seldom name our subjects, in part because they will not be around very long, but also because we do not want to get 'attached'. Outside of their natural (or even 'naturalistic') environments, our subjects are like little aliens to us, with their weird behaviours and strange faces. And by perceiving them as aliens, we often find it difficult to sympathize with their plight. Looking back on my own formal education in biology, I am struck by two facts: I was never taught about the natural behaviour of the animals most commonly used as research subjects, nor was I taught about the controversial issues surrounding animal experimentation. The latter was a topic that was broached only by dismissing animal welfare activists as 'lunatics'. I am sure that my educational background in biology is not unique.
Future students of the life sciences no longer need to be kept in the dark about the historical and ethical debate regarding animal experimentation. Vaughan Monamy has written a pithy, balanced guide to the issues. In Animal Experimentation, Monamy covers the history of animal experimentation and its opponents, arguments for the moral status of animals, and the current laws and regulations for animal research in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. He concludes the book with a chapter on the search for alternative model systems. The book is explicitly intended for students, and its stated purpose is to introduce students to the modern debate about animal experimentation. What students learn from this book can help them make more informed decisions regarding the extent to which they, personally, are willing to use research animals.
In covering the history of animal experimentation and the opposition to it, Monamy also describes the attitudes that prevailed at the time certain types of experiments were conducted. For example, in the early Christian era, we learn that anatomists regularly conducted experiments on live, unanaesthetized dogs, as members of the Catholic clergy looked on with admiration. At this time, the Christian church adopted the view that only humans were blessed with the gift of reason and thus shared no common lineage with animals. Animal suffering during experiments was not seen as cruel as long as such experiments had a noble purpose, the pursuit of knowledge. The advent of the modern era of biomedicine marked an increase in both the number of vivisection experiments and the amount of opposition to such experiments. Monamy writes that, historically, the formal opposition to vivisection was built upon three points: (1) the question of whether nonhuman animals were sufficient models for the human condition; (2) the rejection of the Cartesian view of animals as automata that could not feel pain; (3) the antivivisectionist empathy for animals which should lead to granting them some moral status. These three points form the bases of most, if not all, animal welfare/antivivisectionist movements today.
It is this third point, on the moral status of animals, that has garnered the most attention in recent times. Monamy manages to tackle the major philosophical arguments that support giving animals rights as moral agents. In particular, he outlines the similarities and differences between the philosophies of two of the most prominent proponents of animal rights, Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Singer is not against animal experimentation per se, but argues that if an experiment causes more bad than good for sentient life, then it is not justified. Regan, on the other hand, argues that value of any individual (whatever the species) must be measured by how important their lives are to themselves. Regan is totally against any kind of animal experimentation; his view is 'categorically abolitionist'. Monamy also presents the arguments of philosophers who express concern for the welfare of animals, yet do not oppose animal experimentation. Notable among these is the Nobel laureate, Albert Schweitzer. He argued that a 'reverence for life' makes no distinction between 'higher' or 'lower' life forms, and no distinction between humans and nonhuman beings. Nevertheless, Schweitzer held that such an ethic does not mean that causing the death of another creature is wrong, but that causing pain or death when it can be avoided is wrong. Those guided by 'reverence for life' will allow the death or suffering of an animal only in cases of inescapable necessity.
While Regan and Schweitzer may make no distinctions among 'higher' or 'lower' forms of life, it is evident from 
